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Quantum communications promise to revolutionise the way information is exchanged and pro-
tected. Unlike their classical counterpart, they are based on dim optical pulses that cannot be
amplified by conventional optical repeaters. Consequently they are heavily impaired by propagation
channel losses, which confine their transmission rate and range below a theoretical limit known as
repeaterless secret key capacity. Overcoming this limit with today’s technology was believed to be
impossible until the recent proposal of a scheme that uses phase-coherent optical signals and an
auxiliary measuring station to distribute quantum information. Here we experimentally demon-
strate such a scheme for the first time and over significant channel losses, in excess of 90 dB. In the
high loss regime, the resulting secure key rate exceeds the repeaterless secret key capacity, a result
never achieved before. This represents a major step in promoting quantum communications as a
dependable resource in today’s world.
Given the colossal amount of digital information trans-
mitted daily and the stringent security requirements of-
ten needed, it is no wonder that quantum communication
is attracting increasing attention from the scientific com-
munity and of the general public. In particular, quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] enables secure com-
munication between two parties (Alice and Bob) without
making assumptions on the computational power of a
potential eavesdropper (Eve). The intriguing capabili-
ties of QKD have motivated intense research to readying
it for real world and everyday use. On one hand, re-
search focusses on the seamless integration of QKD into
existing optical networks [3, 4], as this would enable the
widespread use of QKD through a trusted-node archi-
tecture [5]. On the other hand, when the highest level of
security is demanded, it becomes crucial to avoid, at least
partially, the trusted intermediate nodes, which have no
quantum protection against Eve. In this respect, a prac-
tical solution would be measurement-device-independent
(MDI) QKD [6] (see also [7, 8]), which allows two par-
ties to communicate via an intermediate, completely un-
trusted, node. A complete solution would be quantum
repeaters [9–12], but they are still outside today’s tech-
nological reach.
All forms of QKD, however, are only possible under a
certain amount of loss. If 1 − η is the total loss of the
quantum channel, the secure key rate of QKD scales at
best linearly with η [13, 14]. This is a fundamental phys-
ical limit, known as “repeaterless secret key capacity”
(SKC0) [14]. The subscript ‘0’ emphasises the absence
of any repeater between the users, even a simple trusted
node that distils one key with Alice and one with Bob.
So the SKC0 quantifies the maximum secret information
that can be exchanged on a direct optical link.
In MDI-QKD, as well as in entanglement-based
QKD [2, 15], there is an intermediate untrusted node,
usually called Charlie, that relays the quantum signals
between the users. Therefore, in principle, these schemes
could achieve a better capacity than QKD and even over-
come the SKC0 [16] using only untrusted nodes. This
possibility has been described theoretically for adap-
tive MDI-QKD [17] as well as for entanglement-based
QKD [18] and MDI-QKD, when both are assisted by
quantum memories [19, 20]. However, despite being sim-
pler than a full-fledged quantum repeater [9–12], these
schemes still rely on quantum memories, which are not
practical. As a result, no experiment has yet overcome
the SKC0 using only intermediate untrusted nodes.
Recently, it was theoretically shown that a phase-
based setup realisable with existing, standard, off-the-
shelf components has the potential to overcome the re-
peaterless bound [21]. The new scheme, named twin-field
QKD (TF-QKD) for its use of remotely prepared optical
fields with similar (i.e. twin) phases, provides a key rate
that scales with η1/2, overcomes the SKC0 at long dis-
tances and, like MDI-QKD, makes use of an intermediate
node that can be completely untrusted. TF-QKD was
initially proven secure under restrictive assumptions on
Eve [21] which have recently been removed [22–27], thus
providing unconditionally secure TF-QKD protocols.
In TF-QKD, Alice and Bob encode their information
in two optical pulses that are sent to a central beam split-
ter, located in the intermediate station. Random phases
are initially added to the pulses, or to part of them, to
improve the performance of the scheme through the use
of decoy states [28–30]. The information retrieved from
the detection events, announced by Charlie, is used to
form a secret key, or to test the channel against the pres-
ence of Eve, or both. Many variants of this basic scheme
are possible. The most practical ones, based on coherent
states, are characterised by some crucial ingredients: the
first-order interference of the optical pulses at the inter-
mediate node and their subsequent single-photon detec-
tion; the phase randomisation of some of the pulses fol-
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lowed, in some cases, by the reconciliation of the phases
in post-processing. To implement these features, the dis-
tant users need to phase-stabilise the optical paths con-
necting them to the intermediate node. Even with per-
fectly prepared pulses, the microscopic length variation
in either path is sufficient to prevent the high-visibility
interference required for successful TF-QKD.
Here we report the first experiment where a positive
key rate is obtained using TF-QKD. The resulting key
rate overcomes the SKC0 limit at high channel losses and
remains positive up to about 90 dB. This is 100 times
more loss than in previous record-distance experiments
with QKD [31] and MDI-QKD [32] and a total loss five
orders of magnitudes larger than in satellite QKD [33].
It represents the first experimental evidence that the re-
peaterless secret key capacity bound can be overcome.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In our realisation of TF-QKD, we consider a gener-
alised protocol (see Methods) that can be modified to
encompass various TF-QKD protocols based on coher-
ent states [21–26]. To experimentally validate these pro-
tocols and overcome the SKC0 bound, Alice and Bob
should use two separate lasers to prepare coherent states
in a given phase and polarisation state, with various in-
tensities. The two separate lasers should be phase-locked
to let the users reconcile their phase values. We repre-
sent Alice’s states as |√µaeiϕa〉, where µa is the inten-
sity and ϕa ∈ [0, 2pi) is the phase. Bob prepares similar
states with the subscript a replaced by b. The phases
ϕa,b include both the bit information and the random
values needed in coherent-state TF-QKD. The optical
pulses emitted by the users should interfere with high
visibility in the intermediate station after having trav-
elled through a pair of highly lossy channels. High loss
is needed to overcome the SKC0 [21]. The optical phase
should remain stable in time, which is challenging when
the channel loss reduces the amount of detected counts.
We implement these features using the experimental
setup shown in Fig. 1. Each user is endowed with a
continuous-wave laser source (LS). Alice’s LS acts as the
phase reference. Its light is split in two at a first beam
splitter (BS). One part is sent to Bob through a ser-
vice fibre, depicted in orange in Fig. 1a, and is used
to lock Bob’s LS via a heterodyne optical phase-locked
loop (OPLL [34], see Supplementary Section 1 for further
details). In Bob’s module, the reference light interferes
with another light beam prepared by Bob and shifted by
80 MHz by an acousto optic modulator (AOM). A pho-
todiode acts as a phase-sensitive detector (PSD), whose
intensity is mapped onto a phase difference δϕ between
the reference light and Bob’s local light. A feedback is
then given to Bob’s laser based on the value of δϕ. With
this OPLL, Bob’s laser is locked to Alice’s with a phase
error less than 5◦, which includes a potential phase fluc-
tuation in the fibre connecting Alice to Bob. An attacker
could modify the reference light while it travels from Al-
ice to Bob, but that would not affect the security of the
scheme. Any modification would translate into a differ-
ent value of δϕ, which is equivalent to Eve introducing
phase noise on the main channels going from the users to
Charlie (see also [35] for a similar argument applied to
QKD). However, we do not claim here the robustness of
Alice’s and Bob’s modules to side-channel attacks, which
requires more scrutiny, similarly to the one ongoing for
the MDI-QKD sending modules.
The fraction of each user’s light not involved in the
phase-locking mechanism is directed to the Encoder, de-
picted in Fig. 1b. Here it enters the cavity of a slave
laser diode (LD) that is periodically gain-switched to
produce a pulse train at 2 GHz. This ensures that each
pulse will inherit the phase of the injected optical field,
which is locked to the reference light. Moreover, Alice
and Bob’s LDs will emit pulses as narrow as 70 ps at
1548.92 nm, with high extinction ratio and constant in-
tensity due to the strength of optical injection into the
slave laser being 1,400 times weaker than the electrical
injection, as we measured. After the LD, the optical
pulses pass through an in-line phase modulator (PM),
which applies fast modulation from an RF signal to en-
code the phase values required by the specific TF-QKD
protocol, and a slow correction from a DC signal to com-
pensate the phase noise on the paths linking to Charlie.
After setting the optical pulses’ polarisation and inten-
sity, the pulses pass through 15 GHz filters that clean
their spectral mode [36], thus ensuring high visibility in-
terference between the twin-fields. Then they are sent to
variable optical attenuators (VOAs) that vary the loss of
the channel connecting the users to Charlie.
Alice and Bob’s optical fields interfere on Charlie’s BS
and are eventually detected by superconducting nanowire
single photon detectors (SNSPDs, Single Quantum EOS
410 CS) cooled at 3.2 K, featuring 22 Hz dark count rate
and 44% detection efficiency. Detector D1 is associated
with a 100 ps resolution time tagger and is used to extract
the raw key rate. D2 monitors the optical field leakage
into the non-intended polarisation, which is minimised by
Alice and Bob through their polarisation controllers. D3
is sampled by a photon counter at a minimum interval of
10 ms to stabilise the overall phase.
RESULTS
The first task is providing the users with weak coherent
pulses that are locked to a common phase reference and
capable of interfering on Charlie’s BS. Then part of these
pulses have to be phase randomised with respect to the
phase reference. In some TF-QKD protocols [21–24], it
is necessary that the users know the values of the random
phases, whereas in others [25–27] this is not mandatory.
In the current setup we randomise the phase in an ac-
tive way and obtain a first-order interference visibility at
Charlie of 96.4% when the OPLL is active and the two
2
This article has been published in Nature Photonics 13, 334-338 (2019)
a
b
FIG. 1. Experimental setup. a, Alice and Bob generate light beams from their local continuous-wave laser sources (LSs)
and send them onto their beam splitters. From each beam splitter, one output beam goes to the Encoders and is used to perform
TF-QKD. The other is used to lock the users’ LSs through a service fibre, depicted in orange. Alice sends part of her light to
Bob through the service fibre. Bob interferes it with his own, after shifting its frequency by 80 MHz through an acousto-optic
modulator (AOM). The beating signal resulting from the interference is detected with a phase-sensitive detector (PSD) whose
current is proportional to the phase difference between Alice’s and Bob’s light beams. An electronic feedback is then given to
Bob’s LS based on the detected difference to lock its phase to Alice’s one. This constitutes a heterodyne optical phase-locked
loop (OPLL). b, In the Encoder modules, the continuous-wave light prepared locally by Alice’s and Bob’s LSs, seeds a gain-
switched laser diode (LD) that carves it into pulses. The optical pulses are either rapidly modulated or finely controlled in
phase by the phase modulators (PMs). After crossing the electrical polarisation controller (EPC) and the intensity controller
(INT), part of the pulses is directed to the power detector (PD) for monitoring the intensity and the other part travels through
the quantum channel towards Charlie’s beam splitter (BS). Here, they interfere with the other user’s pulses. The outcome of
the interference is registered by the SNSPD detectors D1, D2 and D3. Variable optical attenuators (VOAs) add losses to the
quantum channel. C, circulator; SF, spectral filter; FA, fixed attenuator; PL, polariser; PBS, polarising beam splitter.
PMs in Alice and Bob encode equal phases. We encode a
pseudo-random pattern containing 210 symbols having 25
modulation levels through the PMs driven by high-speed
12 GSa/s digital-to-analogue converters (DACs) with 8-
bit amplitude resolution. The number of phases we chose
is sufficiently close to a phase randomisation with infinite
random phases [37]. However, to further demonstrate a
full phase randomisation, we performed a parallel exper-
iment using a continuous phase randomisation from a
master gain-switched laser [38, 39] (see Supplementary
Section 2). For that, we removed the OPLL and active
phase randomisation from the setup, while leaving active
phase encoding. Then we locked Alice and Bob’s lasers to
the main master laser by optical injection locking [36, 40]
and obtained a visibility of 97.5%, 1.1% higher than in
the previous case. We attribute this difference to the ab-
sence of errors from the OPLL and the active phase ran-
domisation. This result shows that the overall visibility
is not affected by the absolute number of encoded phases
(it is higher with more phases than less) as much as by
the components used to implement it. The base quantum
bit error rate (QBER) of the system remains in all cases
smaller than 1.8% and there is no in-principle limitation
to increasing the number of the encoded phases.
The ambient temperature fluctuations cause the ex-
perimentally obtained interference to drift. Even with
40 metres of optical fibre, the environmental fluctuations
cause a relative phase drift in our setup of 0.7 rad/s.
This requires a feedback control every 10 – 100 ms to
avoid detrimental effects on the QBER. To implement
this phase control, we doubled the pulse pattern to 2048
bits and temporally interleaved phase-encoded pulses and
unmodulated reference pulses, with equal duty cycles and
intensities. This is done by clocking the phase modula-
tors in Alice and Bob’s setup at 2 GHz and by actively
switching between reference pulses and encoding pulses.
This reduces the effective clock rate of the TF-QKD pro-
tocol to 1 GHz. The photon detection clicks are recorded
by Charlie with time-tagging electronics and are grouped
in post-processing according to their phase values. From
these events we retrieve the gain and the QBER of the
system (Supplementary Section 4). The phase correction
3
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Equivalent ULL fibre length (km)
Channel loss (dB)
FIG. 2. Gain and QBER of TF-QKD. The gain is the
detection probability per encoding gate. Gain and QBER are
plotted against the channel loss 1 − η. The equivalent fibre
length on the top axis pertains to an ultra-low-loss (ULL) fibre
with attenuation coefficient 0.16 dB/km. The different scaling
laws of the gain for a QKD-like single-path quantum trans-
mission and for a TF-QKD-like double-path quantum trans-
mission are apparent. The upward and downward triangular
(square) points on the dotted (dashed) line are the single-path
(double-path) experimental detection rate recorded for differ-
ent channel loss. The circle points on the solid line are the
double-path experimental QBER of the interfering pulses. All
the experimental data agrees well with the theoretical curves.
from reference pulses is designed to keep Alice and Bob’s
optical fields locked on Charlie’s BS at a constant pi/2
phase difference. This is the most efficient solution as it
exploits the linear part of the response function (see Sup-
plementary Section 3 for further discussion). The phase
offset is continuously monitored by detector D3 and cor-
rected by acting on the DC level of one of the PMs in
the transmitting modules. This is equivalent to having
an extra PM in Charlie’s station, as proposed in ref. [21].
A main advantage of TF-QKD is the scaling property
of the secret key rate with the square-root of the chan-
nel transmission, η1/2. This would be impossible with-
out correspondingly having the square-root scaling of the
detection rate. We verified this essential feature of TF-
QKD directly and summarised the result in Fig. 2. The
data corresponding to a direct-link quantum transmission
were taken by shutting off one arm of our experimen-
tal setup, thus allowing a single user at a time to signal
to Charlie’s station. The data for double-path transmis-
sion, on the other hand, were taken with both arms open.
As is apparent from the figure, the single-path gain (tri-
angular points on the dotted line) scales linearly with
the loss, 1 − η, whereas the double-path gain (square
points on the dashed line) scales with the square-root.
At any given gain, the double-path TF-QKD can toler-
ate channel loss twice as large than single-path direct-link
QKD. In the same figure, we also report the experimen-
tal QBER of TF-QKD, which is composed of three main
contributions: the quantum state preparation, detectors’
dark counts and feedback routine. In our setup, the last
two terms significantly affect the overall QBER only at
losses higher than 70 dB.
Our experimental results are independent of the spe-
cific security analysis adopted to extract a key rate.
Hence they can be used as a reference to test the per-
formance of any TF-QKD-like protocol. Here we anal-
yse the data for three TF-QKD protocols, two [21, 24]
over the whole loss range and one [26] at a specific loss
around 70 dB. The protocol in ref. [21] is the original TF-
QKD scheme and acts as a reference. The protocols in
refs. [24, 26], on the other hand, have been conceived to
be unconditionally secure. We have implemented them
using three intensities, which is practical as compared
with infinite intensities in their initial proposals.
In Fig. 3 we plot the secure key rates (SKRs) versus
the channel loss for the protocols analysed. We also plot
two lines for the repeaterless secret key capacity, which
we call ideal and realistic SKC0, respectively. The for-
mer is the expression given in [14], log2[1/(1 − η)], with
detectors implicitly assumed to be 100% efficient. This
SKC0 is impossible to overcome without an intermediate
repeater. The latter represents a direct comparison with
our experiment and assumes a QKD performed with one
detector and efficiency slightly larger than in our setup.
The darker-pink (lighter-pink) shaded area is the
supremacy region where the SKR of the protocol in [24]
(the protocol in [21]) surpasses the realistic SKC0. This
region extends from about 50 dB to 83 dB, limited only
by detectors’ dark counts. In this range, our TF-QKD
scheme provides more SKR than a QKD scheme with
the same components. This is remarkable in light of the
fact that TF-QKD is more secure than QKD, as it pro-
tects against attacks directed at the detection devices.
Even more interestingly, there are experimental points
that fall beyond the ideal SKC0. At 71.1 dB, for in-
stance, the SKRs of the protocols in refs. [24] and [26] are
213.0 bit/s and 270.7 bit/s, respectively, i.e. 1.90 times
and 2.42 times larger than the corresponding ideal SKC0
(112.0 bit/s). This is the first time that this fundamental
limit has been overcome experimentally. It is worth men-
tioning that all the reported SKRs are quite conservative
as they include the penalty due to an imperfect error-
correction (fEC = 1.15). The maximum channel loss
over which we can stabilise the phase and obtain a pos-
itive key rate is 90.8 dB (rightmost red circle in Fig. 3).
This is equivalent to 454 km and 567 km of standard
and ultralow-loss (ULL, 0.16 dB/km) single-mode opti-
cal fibre, respectively, connecting the users. We inciden-
tally notice that values up to 0.1419 dB/km are currently
achievable in fibres at 1560 nm [41].
It is interesting to compare these results with the cur-
rent record distances [31, 32] obtained in QKD and MDI-
QKD experiments over long-haul fibres in the finite-size
scenario. The QKD record distance is 421.1 km in ULL
fibre, with a key rate of 0.25 bit/s over a total channel
4
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FIG. 3. TF-QKD key rates. Secret key rates are plotted against the channel loss (lower horizontal axis) and the corre-
sponding ULL fibre distance (upper horizontal axis). The markers show the acquired experimental data whereas the solid lines
follow from simulations. The ideal repeaterless SKC0 [14] (dashed line) and the realistic one (dotted line) are plotted along
with the key rates of the original TF-QKD protocol [21] (red circles), the protocol in ref. [24] (blue triangles) and the protocol
in ref. [26] (yellow square). The TF-QKD supremacy region is in pink shades. The simulations assume 1 GHz effective clock
rate. The realistic repeaterless bound assumes a total detection efficiency of 35% plus 3 dB loss due to having one detector
in Charlie’s module. Other parameters are: α = 0.16 dB/km, ULL fibre attenuation; fEC = 1.15, error correction coefficient.
ηC = 30.8%, total transmission of Charlie’s module, resulting from ηdet = 44% and ηcoupling = 70%; Pdc = 22 Hz, dark count
rate. Charlie is assumed to be at equal distance from Alice and Bob. The photon fluxes are specified in the Methods.
loss of 71.9 dB [31]. This was made possible by a 2.5 GHz
clock rate and a detector dark count rate of 0.1 Hz. For
a similar channel loss, with our 1 GHz effective clock
rate, the SKR of any of the TF-QKD protocols anal-
ysed is three orders of magnitude higher. The longest
demonstration of MDI-QKD is on 404 km of ULL opti-
cal fibre obtained with the protocol in [42]. With a clock
rate of 75 MHz, it provided an SKR of 3.2× 10−4 bit/s
over a total channel loss of 64.64 dB [32], which is six or-
ders of magnitude smaller than the TF-QKD key rates at
71.1 dB. Although our results have been achieved in the
asymptotic regime and do not include finite-size effects
or long-haul real fibres, as the experiments in [31, 32],
the improvement they entail appears to be substantial.
CONCLUSIONS
In TF-QKD, quantum information is carried by the op-
tical fields prepared by Alice and Bob. Fields can toler-
ate larger loss than photons and can potentially increase
the rate and range of quantum communications [21]. In
the present work, we have provided the first experimen-
tal evidence of this potential, surpassing, for the first
time, the rate-loss limit of direct-link quantum commu-
nications [14] with an intermediate untrusted node.
To achieve this goal, the users have to prepare light
pulses that are phase stabilised and at the same time
phase randomised respect to a shared phase reference.
The phase stabilisation between the lasers was achieved
by an optical phase-locked loop, which also guarantees
that the reference light emitted by Alice and possibly
manipulated by Eve is securely transferred to Bob. The
phase stabilisation across the channels linking Alice and
Bob to Charlie was achieved using efficient feedback
based on unmodulated reference optical pulses of the
same intensity as the quantum pulses used for key gener-
ation. This maintains interference stability to overcome
the rate-loss theoretical limit and extract a positive key
rate over a 90 dB loss link, which is about 20 dB larger
than in any other previous quantum communication test.
Our proof-of-concept experiment shows that TF-QKD
can greatly enhance the range and rate of quantum com-
munications using presently available technology.
METHODS
Generalised TF-QKD protocol
State Preparation – Alice randomly selects: the bit value
αa = {0, 1}, with probability pαa ; the basis value βa =
{0, 1} = {Z,X}, with probability pβa ; the global phase value
φa ∈ [0, 2pi), with uniform probability pφa ; the intensity
value µa = {ua, va, wa}, with probability pµa . She uses the
setup in Fig. 1to prepare a coherent state |√µaeiϕa〉, where
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ϕa = φa + αapi + βapi/2. Bob does the same, with subscripts
a replaced by b and same values for the parameters, unless
explicitly stated.
This step represents the state preparation of the original
TF-QKD protocol [21] and of the one in ref. [22]. To increase
the asymptotic key rate, the probability of the majority basis,
pZ , can be set arbitrarily close to 1, similarly to the efficient
version of the BB84 protocol [43]. Along the same line, the
state preparation of the TF-QKD protocol in ref. [23] can
be obtained by simply setting the probability of the minor-
ity basis, pX , equal to 0. In ref. [25] and in the Protocol 3
of ref. [26], which relies on coherent states, the global phase
is randomised only in the ‘test’ basis, which we choose here
equal to X, while it is constant in the ‘encoding’ basis, which
we choose here equal to Z. For the state preparation of the
protocol in ref. [24], we can treat the X basis as in the origi-
nal TF-QKD protocol whereas for the Z basis we set wa,b = 0
and pua,b = 1− pwa,b = , pva,b = 0. A close-to-optimal value
for  is 10%. In our simulations, we set it equal to 7.8%. We
then relate the bit value 0 (1) to the instances of the Z basis
where Alice encoded wa (ua) and Bob encoded ub (wb).
In the above preparation of the intensity, we considered for
simplicity only three values, as opposed to the infinite values
considered in most of the TF-QKD proposals. On one hand,
this setting can easily be generalised to any number of inten-
sities, even infinite, like in the original decoy-state QKD [30].
On the other hand, the possibility to import the decoy-state
technique into TF-QKD is the main motivation for having
multiple intensities in the protocol. The only exception is
ref. [27], which we could not include in the above description
as it does not resort to phase randomisation and decoy states
to extrapolate a key rate from the acquired sample. For the
other protocols, we describe below how to apply the decoy-
state technique with three intensities.
Measurement – Alice and Bob send their optical pulses to
the central relay station, Charlie, who does not need to be
honest. A honest Charlie would send the incoming pulses
on his beam splitter, measure the output pulses and report
which of his two detectors clicked. A dishonest Charlie, how-
ever, could use any detection scheme he pleases. This would
not affect the security of the protocol as TF-QKD’s secu-
rity, similarly to MDI-QKD, is independent of the detection
scheme. This implies that the secret key rate extracted by
the users when Charlie is dishonest is always lower than or
equal to the one they would extract if Charlie is honest. In
our experiment, Charlie announces counts from the detector
D1 only.
Announcement – After repeating the above steps many
times, the honest Charlie announces over a public authen-
ticated channel the events where one and only one detector
clicked. Alice and Bob announce their intensity values µa,b,
their basis values βa,b and their global phases φa,b.
This step holds for protocols in [21, 23], even if the an-
nouncement of the basis is redundant in [23] because pX = 0.
For the protocols in [24–26], the intensity values are an-
nounced only in the X basis, whereas the global phases are
announced only in the X basis for [24] and never announced
in [25, 26]. This latter feature is remarkable and can entail
a great experimental simplification. For the protocol in [22],
Alice selects two modes of execution. In the ‘test mode’ the
global phases are never disclosed, thus allowing a rigorous ap-
plication of the decoy-state method; in the ‘code mode’, the
global phases are announced to let the users reconcile their bit
values. The bases are always announced unless a particular
event occurs in the code mode.
Sifting – Among the announced successful detections, Al-
ice and Bob keep the events that have matching values. In all
cases, either for a specific basis or for both bases, they keep
those events whose phases are ‘twins’, i.e., no more different
than a certain tolerance level ∆ modulo pi, due to the sym-
metry of TF-QKD with respect to the addition of pi to the
phase values [23]. After sifting their data, the users keep αa
and αb (αb ⊕ 1) as their raw key bits if Charlie announced a
detection related to a 0 (pi) phase difference between Alice’s
and Bob’s phases.
This holds for protocols in [21–23] with minor differences.
For the protocol in [24], it holds in the X basis. The raw
key bit, however, is obtained from the Z basis when single
clicks are announced by Charlie, irrespective of which detector
clicked. For the protocols in [25, 26], it holds with ∆ = 0 in
the encoding basis.
Parameter Estimation – A raw key is formed by concate-
nating the raw key bits obtained in the previous step. All the
remaining data unrelated to the key bits can be fully disclosed
to estimate the decoy-state parameters related to security.
Up to minor differences, this step is the same in all TF-
QKD protocols. In fact, they all use the decoy-state tech-
nique [28–30] to estimate the single-photon quantities related
to security, with the exception of [27], which was already kept
out of our description. Even in [23] decoy states are exten-
sively used to estimate the photon-number dependent quan-
tities appearing in the phase error rate of the protocol. In
this case, having only three intensities for µa,b might be in-
sufficient to obtain a tight estimation of the phase error rate.
A similar argument applies to ref. [25], where four intensity
levels were used to obtain a good key rate. Here we find that
three intensity levels are sufficient to extract good key rates
from the protocols in Refs. [21, 24] and [26].
Key distillation – The users run classical post-processing
procedures such as error correction and privacy amplification
to distil the final secure key from the raw key.
The amount of privacy amplification in this step is spe-
cific to each TF-QKD protocol as it depends on the de-
tailed security analysis. In the present work, we only con-
sider two specific key distillation rates for exemplificative pur-
poses, given in Refs. [21, 24]. For both protocols we con-
sider the standard decoy state equations in the asymptotic
scenario, providing the lower bound for the 0-photon yield,
y
0
= (vQwe
w − wQvev)/(v − w); the lower bound for the 1-
photon yield, y
1
= [u2Qve
v − u2Qwew − (v2 − w2)(Queu −
y
0
)]/[u(uv − uw − v2 + w2)]; and the upper bound for the
1-photon error rate, e1 = (EvQve
v − EwQwew)/[(v − w)y
1
].
In these equations, u = ua +ub, v = va + vb and w = wa +wb
are the total intensity values for the signal state, the decoy
state and the vacuum state, respectively. For the total in-
tensity, we also use the symbol µ = µa + µb = {u, v, w}. In
our experiment, we set u = 0.4, v = 0.16 and w = 10−5 for
the protocols in [21, 24] and ua = ub = 0.02, va = vb = 0.2,
w = 10−5 for the protocol in [26]. The parameters y
1
(y
0
)
and e1 are, respectively, the lower bound for the single-photon
(zero-photon) yield and the upper bound for the single-photon
phase error rate; Qµ and Eµ are the gain and QBER measured
by detector D1 in Fig. 1a. Then for the original TF-QKD key
rate we use
R′ = {Q
1
[1− h(e1)]− fECQuh(Eu)}/M ′. (1)
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Here, Q
1
= µe−µy
1
is the lower bound for the single-photon
gain; fEC is the error correction factor, set equal to 1.15 in our
simulations; h the binary entropy function; M ′ = M/2 and
M is the number of phase slices used to reconcile the global
random phase, set equal to 16 in our simulations. In Eq. (1),
Eu includes EM , the intrinsic misalignment error of TF-QKD,
which is equal to 1.275% for M = 16 [21]. The key rate in
Eq. (1) is secure under the conditions clarified in ref. [21].
When these conditions are not met, Eve can perform other
attacks like the ‘collective beam splitting’ (CBS) attack [21]
or the one described in [44].
For the ‘Send-Not Send’ TF-QKD protocol by Wang et
al. [24] we use the key rate equation
R′′ = Qz
0
+Qz
1
[1− h(e1)]− fECQzh(Ez), (2)
with Qz = 2Qu + (1 − )(Qua + Qub) + (1 − )2Q0,
Ez = [2Qu + (1 − )2Q0]/Qz. The parameter  has been
defined in the state preparation step of the protocol; Qu,
Qua , Qub , Q0 are the gains (i.e. ratio of successfully de-
tected events to sent optical pulses) of the protocol, mea-
sured in the experiment when both of the users, only Al-
ice, only Bob, none of the users, respectively, send out op-
tical pulses. The values for these quantities at each at-
tenuation level are reported the Supplementary Informa-
tion. The single-photon gain in the Z basis assumes the
form Qz
1
=
[
(1− )(uae−ua + ube−ub) + 2(ue−u)
]
y
1
and
Q
0
=
[
(1− )2 + (1− )(e−ua + e−ub) + 2e−u] y
0
. The
single-photon quantities y
0
, y
1
and e1 are drawn from the
X basis of the protocol using the equations written above. In
this specific protocol, the number of phase slices is large, lead-
ing to no misalignment error in the X basis. Also, unlike the
original send-not send TF-QKD [24], we consider here three
intensities to implement the decoy-state technique, which is
practical. Finally, we include an extra term Qz
0
in the key rate
equation (2), accounting for the fact that Eve cannot extract
any useful information from the vacuum pulses prepared by
the users [45, 46].
For the protocol by Curty et al. [26] we use the key rate
equation written for their Protocol 3, after adding the error
correction factor fEC , to make the proposal more practical:
R′′′ = Qz[1− h(ex1)]− fECQzh(Ez). (3)
This extra term makes the key rate smaller, so it is even more
difficult to overcome the SKC0 when it is taken into account.
The counts for the raw key come from detector D1 in the
setup of Fig. 1a, as for the other protocols. Most quantities
in Eq. (3) are similar to those already introduced for the other
protocols, with the exception of the phase error rate ex1 , which
deserves a specific discussion. It has been taken from Eq. (15)
of ref. [26] and amounts to
ex1 =
1
Qz
∑
j=0,1
[ ∞∑
m,n=0
c(j)m c
(j)
n
√
Y
x
mn
]2
≤ 1
Qz
∑
j=0,1
[ ∞∑
m,n=0
c(j)m c
(j)
n
√
gmn(Y
x
mn, Ycut)
]2
' 1
Qz
∑
j=0,1
[
Ncut∑
m,n=0
c(j)m c
(j)
n
√
gmn(Y
x
mn, Ycut)
]2
. (4)
In Eq. (4), the coefficient c
(0)
k (c
(1)
k ) is defined as c
(0)
k =
e−µ/2µk/2/
√
k! when the integer k is even (odd) and 0 oth-
erwise [26]; gmn(Y
x
mn, Ycut) is a function equal to Y
x
mn if
m + n < Ycut and equal to 1 otherwise; Ycut, Ncut are two
integers such that Ycut < Ncut. In our experiment we set
Ycut = 5 and Ncut = 20. The quantities Y
x
mn are upper
bounds for the yields obtained when Alice sent m photons
and Bob sent n photons. These are estimated using a con-
strained optimisation linear program within the standard de-
coy state technique [29, 30], with the only difference that the
yields have to be maximised rather than minimised in order
to provide the worst-case phase error rate. For the quantity
Y
x
01, for example, we look for the maximum of Y
x
01 in the
interval [0, 1] constrained by the gains QxµA,µB that are mea-
sured when Alice prepares the intensity µA and Bob prepares
the intensity µB in the decoy basis X. The intensities pre-
pared by the users take on three values: u (signal), v (decoy)
and w (vacuum). A positive and nearly optimal key rate (i.e.
close to asymptotic scenario) is found when we set u = 0.02,
v = 0.2 and w < 10−5, i.e., when the intensity of the decoy
state is larger than the one of the signal state. Moreover, we
measured all the intensity combinations uu, uv, uw, vv, vw
and ww to improve the decoy-state estimation. This method
with only three intensities was not disclosed in the original
protocol [26] and we propose it here for the first time. The
simulations agree well with the experimental data, providing
an SKR of 271.3 bit/s.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We acknowledge useful discussions with Marcos Curty
about the protocol in ref. [26]. M.M. acknowledges fi-
nancial support from the Engineering and Physical Sci-
ences Research Council (EPSRC) and Toshiba Research
Europe Ltd. M.P. acknowledges funding from the Euro-
pean Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-
gramme under the Marie Sk lodowska-Curie grant agree-
ment No 675662. G.L.R. acknowledges financial sup-
port via the EPSRC funded Centre for Doctoral Training
(CDT) in Integrated Photonic and Electronic Systems,
Toshiba Research Europe Ltd. and The Royal Commis-
sion for the Exhibition of 1851.
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Theor. Comput. Sci. 560,
7 (2014).
[2] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
7
This article has been published in Nature Photonics 13, 334-338 (2019)
[3] P. D. Townsend, Nature 385, 47 (1997).
[4] B. Fro¨hlich, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, A. W. Sharpe,
Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, Nature 501, 69 (2013).
[5] M. Peev, C. Pacher, R. Alle´aume, C. Barreiro, J. Bouda,
W. Boxleitner, T. Debuisschert, E. Diamanti, M. Dianati,
J. F. Dynes, S. Fasel, S. Fossier, M. Fu¨rst, J.-D. Gautier,
O. Gay, N. Gisin, P. Grangier, A. Happe, Y. Hasani,
M. Hentschel, H. Hu¨bel, G. Humer, T. La¨nger, M. Legre´,
R. Lieger, J. Lodewyck, T. Loru¨nser, N. Lu¨tkenhaus,
A. Marhold, T. Matyus, O. Maurhart, L. Monat,
S. Nauerth, J.-B. Page, A. Poppe, E. Querasser, G. Ri-
bordy, S. Robyr, L. Salvail, A. W. Sharpe, A. J. Shields,
D. Stucki, M. Suda, C. Tamas, T. Themel, R. T. Thew,
Y. Thoma, A. Treiber, P. Trinkler, R. Tualle-Brouri,
F. Vannel, N. Walenta, H. Weier, H. Weinfurter, I. Wim-
berger, Z. L. Yuan, H. Zbinden, and A. Zeilinger, New
J. Phys. 11, 075001 (2009).
[6] H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108,
130503 (2012).
[7] S. L. Braunstein and S. Pirandola, Phys. Rev. Lett. 108,
130502 (2012).
[8] K. Tamaki, H.-K. Lo, C.-H. F. Fung, and B. Qi, Phys.
Rev. A 86, 059903 (2012).
[9] H.-J. Briegel, W. Du¨r, J. I. Cirac, and P. Zoller, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 81, 5932 (1998).
[10] L.-M. Duan, M. D. Lukin, J. I. Cirac, and P. Zoller,
Nature 414, 413 (2001).
[11] N. Sangouard, C. Simon, H. de Riedmatten, and
N. Gisin, Rev. Mod. Phys. 83, 33 (2011).
[12] S. Guha, H. Krovi, C. A. Fuchs, Z. Dutton, J. A. Slater,
C. Simon, and W. Tittel, Phys. Rev. A 92, 022357
(2015).
[13] M. Takeoka, S. Guha, and M. M. Wilde, Nat. Commun.
5, 5235 (2014).
[14] S. Pirandola, R. Laurenza, C. Ottaviani, and L. Banchi,
Nat. Commun. 8, 15043 (2017).
[15] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. D. Mermin, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[16] S. Pirandola, Preprint at
https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.00966 (2016).
[17] K. Azuma, K. Tamaki, and W. J. Munro, Nat. Commun.
6, 10171 (2015).
[18] D. Luong, L. Jiang, J. Kim, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Appl.
Phys. B 122, 96 (2016).
[19] S. Abruzzo, H. Kampermann, and D. Bruß, Phys. Rev.
A 89, 012301 (2014).
[20] C. Panayi, M. Razavi, X. Ma, and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, New
J. Phys. 16, 043005 (2014).
[21] M. Lucamarini, Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, and A. J.
Shields, Nature 557, 400 (2018).
[22] K. Tamaki, H.-K. Lo, W. Wang, and M. Lucamarini,
Preprint at http://arxiv.org/abs/1805.05511v1 (2018).
[23] X. Ma, P. Zeng, and H. Zhou, Phys. Rev. X 8, 031043
(2018).
[24] X.-B. Wang, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-L. Hu, Phys. Rev. A 98,
062323 (2018).
[25] C. Cui, Z.-Q. Yin, R. Wang, W. Chen, S. Wang,
G.-C. Guo, and Z.-F. Han, Preprint at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1807.02334 (2018).
[26] M. Curty, K. Azuma, and H.-K. Lo, Preprint at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1807.07667 (2018), 1807.07667.
[27] J. Lin and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 98, 042332
(2018).
[28] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[29] X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503 (2005).
[30] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94,
230504 (2005).
[31] A. Boaron, G. Boso, D. Rusca, C. Vulliez, C. Autebert,
M. Caloz, M. Perrenoud, G. Gras, F. Bussires, M.-J. Li,
D. Nolan, A. Martin, and H. Zbinden, Phys. Rev. Lett.
121, 190502 (2018).
[32] H.-L. Yin, T.-Y. Chen, Z.-W. Yu, H. Liu, L.-X. You,
Y.-H. Zhou, S.-J. Chen, Y. Mao, M.-Q. Huang, W.-J.
Zhang, H. Chen, M. J. Li, D. Nolan, F. Zhou, X. Jiang,
Z. Wang, Q. Zhang, X.-B. Wang, and J.-W. Pan, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 117, 190501 (2016).
[33] S.-K. Liao, W.-Q. Cai, W.-Y. Liu, L. Zhang, Y. Li, J.-G.
Ren, J. Yin, Q. Shen, Y. Cao, Z.-P. Li, F.-Z. Li, X.-W.
Chen, L.-H. Sun, J.-J. Jia, J.-C. Wu, X.-J. Jiang, J.-F.
Wang, Y.-M. Huang, Q. Wang, Y.-L. Zhou, L. Deng,
T. Xi, L. Ma, T. Hu, Q. Zhang, Y.-A. Chen, N.-L. Liu,
X.-B. Wang, Z.-C. Zhu, C.-Y. Lu, R. Shu, C.-Z. Peng,
J.-Y. Wang, and J.-W. Pan, Nature 549, 43 (2017).
[34] A. C. Bordonalli, C. Walton, and A. J. Seeds, J. Light.
Technol. 17, 328 (1999).
[35] M. Koashi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 120501 (2004).
[36] L. C. Comandar, M. Lucamarini, B. Fro¨hlich, J. F.
Dynes, Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, Opt. Express 24,
17849 (2016).
[37] Z. Cao, Z. Zhang, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma, New J. Phys.
17, 053014 (2015).
[38] M. Jofre, M. Curty, F. Steinlechner, G. Anzolin, J. P.
Torres, M. W. Mitchell, and V. Pruneri, Opt. Express
19, 20665 (2011).
[39] Z. L. Yuan, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, B. Fro¨hlich,
A. Plews, and A. J. Shields, Appl. Phys. Lett. 104,
261112 (2014).
[40] J. Ye, J.-L. Peng, R. J. Jones, K. W. Holman, J. L. Hall,
D. J. Jones, S. A. Diddams, J. Kitching, S. Bize, J. C.
Bergquist, L. W. Hollberg, L. Robertsson, and L.-S. Ma,
J. Opt. Soc. Am. B 20, 1459 (2003).
[41] Y. Tamura, H. Sakuma, K. Morita, M. Suzuki, Y. Ya-
mamoto, K. Shimada, Y. Honma, K. Sohma, T. Fujii,
and T. Hasegawa, J. Lightwave Technol. 36, 44 (2018).
[42] Y.-H. Zhou, Z.-W. Yu, and X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. A
93, 042324 (2016).
[43] H.-K. Lo, H. F. Chau, and M. Ardehali, J. Cryptol. 18,
133 (2005).
[44] X.-B. Wang, X.-L. Hu, and Z.-W. Yu, Preprint at
http://arxiv.org/abs/1805.02272 (2018).
[45] H.-K. Lo, Quantum Inf. Comput. 5, 413 (2005).
[46] M. Koashi, Preprint at http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-
ph/0609180 (2006).
[47] N. Satyan, W. Liang, and A. Yariv, IEEE J. Quantum
Electron. 45, 755 (2009).
[48] G. L. Roberts, M. Lucamarini, J. F. Dynes, S. J. Savory,
Z. L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields, Appl. Phys. Lett. 111,
261106 (2017).
8
This article has been published in Nature Photonics 13, 334-338 (2019)
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR
EXPERIMENTAL QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION BEYOND THE REPEATERLESS SECRET KEY
CAPACITY
M. Minder1,2†, M. Pittaluga1,3†, G. L. Roberts1,2, M. Lucamarini1?, J. F. Dynes1, Z. L. Yuan1 & A. J. Shields1
1Toshiba Research Europe Ltd, 208 Cambridge Science Park, Cambridge CB4 0GZ, UK
2Department of Engineering, Cambridge University, 9JJ Thomson Avenue, Cambridge CB3 0FA, UK
3School of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK
†These authors contributed equally to this work.
∗email: marco.lucamarini@crl.toshiba.co.uk
OPTICAL PHASE-LOCKED LOOP
In the setup of Fig. 1a, Bob’s laser (slave) is locked
to Alice’s (master) through a heterodyne optical phase-
locked loop (OPLL), which we reproduce in Fig. 4 in more
detail. This is a well-established technique [34, 47] to lock
two lasers with a fixed frequency offset. The light beams
from master and slave interfere on a beam splitter (BS),
generating a beating signal that is recorded by a photo-
diode (PD) and compared with a fixed frequency from an
electrical local oscillator (LO), operated at a frequency
offset between the two lasers ∆f = 80 MHz. This offset is
imparted to the light coming from Bob’s laser through an
acousto-optic modulator (AOM). A phase detector mea-
sures the phase shift between the beating signal and the
LO and produces an error signal that is fed into a loop
filter. The loop filter processes this signal and tunes the
emission frequency of the slave laser so as to minimise
it. When the two lasers are successfully locked with each
other, the slave laser follows the free-running master’s
fluctuations, so that the frequency offset between the two
remains constant.
Alice's
laser
to the exp.
to the exp.
Bob's
laser
AOM
PD
LO
Loop
filter
Mixer
f0
f0+Δf
ΔfΔf
BS
BS
BS f0
f0
f0 f0
a
b
FIG. 4. Schematics of the heterodyne OPLL to lock
Bob’s laser to Alice’s. a, BS, 50/50 beam splitter; PD,
photodiode; Mixer, electronic mixer used as phase detector;
LO, electronic local oscillator; f0, reference frequency; ∆f ,
frequency offset (80 MHz) provided by the LO. b, RF output
of the photodiode as recorded by a spectrum analyser when
the two lasers are phase-locked. An 80 MHz offset is applied to
the graph horizontal axis. The measurement shows a ∼ 40 dB
extinction ratio leading to a residual phase error of σ2φ =
7.53 · 10−3 rad2.
Heterodyne OPLL has been chosen over its homodyne
analogue to have the beat note recorded from the PD far
from DC and close to the frequency of the LO. This al-
lows us to filter out the low-frequency noise and to make
the locking mechanism more robust against intensity fluc-
tuations. In the current experimental implementation,
the residual phase noise associated with the OPLL is
σ2φ = 7.53 · 10−3 rad2 (see Fig. 4b), equivalent to a phase
error of 4.97◦.
BIT ENCODING AND PHASE
RANDOMISATION
There are two kinds of information to be phase en-
coded: the bit/basis and the global random phase. For
that, we use two phase modulators (PMs), one for each
user, driven by a 1 GHz square wave. The amplitude of
the driving signal is related to the phase encoded onto
the optical pulses. The PMs are driven using two chan-
nels of 8-bit DACs, synchronised with the lasers. For the
bit/basis encoding, we test 4 different values correspond-
ing to {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}. For the global random phase,
FIG. 5. Phase randomisation – Support experiment.
Left: colour coded density plot of Alice’s slave laser intensity
after a 500-ps AMZI, when injected by a gain switched mas-
ter laser. Right: histogram of the optical intensity, recorded
along the dashed line in the left figure. Also shown is the
simulation line that accounts for experimental imperfections
(solid black line). The agreement between the experimental
results and simulation indicates that the pulses have random
phase [48]. An analogous measurement on Bob’s slave laser
gives similar results.
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we add a pseudo-random phase on top of the bit-encoded
pulses. The random phase comes from a 210-long string
of values randomly chosen among 25 evenly spaced values
of the [0, 2pi) interval.
Alongside the main experiment, a different experiment
was performed to support its findings. In the support ex-
periment, the users’ lasers were phase-locked to a com-
mon master laser by means of optical injection locking
(OIL) [36, 40]. The master laser was gain-switched to
generate pulses that were fully phase-randomised [38, 39].
The random phase was passed onto the slave lasers by
the OIL mechanism. In the support experiment, we first
verified the effectiveness of the phase randomisation by
interfering pulses of adjacent clock cycles onto a 500-ps
asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI). This
produced the histogram in Fig. 5, which closely re-
sembles the one expected from phase-randomised laser
fields [38, 39, 48]. We then confirmed the phase coordi-
nation between the users by interfering pulse pairs emit-
ted by the users’ lasers at the same clock and obtained a
first-order interference visibility of 98.7%, showing that
active discrete phase randomisation and passive contin-
uous phase randomisation generate a similar visibility.
Both the main and the support experiments were run at
2 GHz with 50% of the optical pulses acting as unmodu-
lated phase reference pulses to stabilise the setup.
PHASE STABILISATION FEEDBACK AND
QBER MODEL
The effectiveness of the control system for both the
main and the support experiment is illustrated in Fig. 6.
For each experiment we plot the QBER of the system as
a function of time, for a channel loss of 30.1 dB between
FIG. 6. Phase stabilisation. For both the main (left) and
the support (right) experiment, the phase feedback system
was turned OFF and ON again. Without the phase feedback,
the relative phase of the optical fields drifts freely, causing
QBER fluctuations between 0 and 50%. Due to the bit-flip
symmetry of the QBER, we show its complementary value
1−QBER whenever it overcomes 50%.
C
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Condition
FIG. 7. Feedback locking condition. Schematic of the
number of counts recorded at D3 as function of the phase
offset between the two quantum channels. A red cross marks
the pi/2 phase locking condition.
Channel loss (dB)
FIG. 8. QBER model. QBER retrieved experimentally
(symbols) alongside their theoretical simulation (solid line).
Also plotted are QBER contributions from the optical error
(thin solid line), the detector dark count (dashed line) and
the feedback error (dotted line).
Alice and Bob. For illustration purposes, the feedback
was first enabled for about 10-15 minutes in both cases.
During this period, the measured QBER was kept at an
average value of 1.8% and 1% in the main and support ex-
periments, respectively. Then, the feedback was disabled
for few minutes, causing large fluctuations. Re-enabling
the feedback restored the low QBER.
To stabilise the setup, we used the count rate of D3
(see Fig. 1a) as feedback signal. With short integration
intervals, the counts detected by D3 can be written as
C = C0 + C1(1− cos ∆ϑ), (5)
where C0 represents the count floor, contributed from
the interference of the encoded pulses in addition to the
detector dark counts, while C1 is the amplitude of the
interference between the unmodulated pulses, and ∆ϑ is
the phase difference which drifts rapidly due to the fibre
length variations. Here, C0 u C1 as we set equal intensity
and probability between the encoded and reference pulses
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in the experiment. The locking point for the stabilisation
is chosen at the quadrature point (∆θ = pi/2), as shown
in Fig. 7.
This is achieved by varying the DC bias of the PM
(Fig. 1b), such that the phase drift can be counteracted
and a constant count rate of C0 + C1 can be maintained.
The phase compensation is provided by a PID controller
that receives as input the number of photons collected by
the photon counter connected to detector D3 and that
modifies the PM’s DC offset through its amplified 12-bit
DAC. The DC offset is corrected every 10-100 ms, with
the precise correction rate optimised for each attenua-
tion value to minimise the QBER fluctuations. Near the
locking point, the count rate is approximately a linear
function of the phase drift and therefore allows precise
phase compensation at the high count rate limit. How-
ever, the feedback count decreases exponentially with the
Alice-Bob channel loss (L˜ in dB) as e−L˜/20 meaning that
the shot noise in the count rate C will become increas-
ingly non-negligible. This introduces an estimation error
in the phase drift that is on average
∆ϑe ≈ 2/
√
C (6)
and still allows for an approximate phase correction at
high loss.
We model the experimentally measured QBER with
the results shown in Fig. 8. To simulate the feedback
error, we assume that the phase estimation error causes
a persistent phase misalignment that is proportional to
∆ϑe, with a coefficient as the only fitting parameter used
in the entire model. All other parameters were directly
taken from the experiment. Besides the feedback error,
we take into account two more error sources. The op-
tical error, arising from the finite interference visibility
and any modulation error in the electrical signals, con-
tributes to a baseline QBER (thin solid line). The detec-
tor dark count (dashed line) contributes to the increase
in the QBER starting from channel losses greater than
60 dB. The feedback error affects mainly the last point,
at approximately 90 dB attenuation. The QBER model
includes all the sources of error and well reproduces the
experimental data.
DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Alice → Charlie Bob → Charlie Alice & Bob → Charlie Secret key rate
Attenuation Gain Attenuation Gain Attenuation Gain QBERref. [21] ref. [24] SKC0
(dB) (×10−6) (dB) (×10−6) (dB) (×10−6) % (×103) bit/sec
10.7 3000.8 10.8 3149.9 21.5 5562.8 2.29 159 74.5 10,250
1154.4 1228.7 2172.4 2.20
15.3 993.4 15.2 985.8 30.5 1984.0 1.79 66.1 30.4 1,286
382.2 388.3 765.7 1.96
20.4 301.1 20.3 293.8 40.7 592.1 1.87 19.2 8.86 122.8
117.2 117.0 233.4 1.99
25.1 95.4 25.0 100.4 50.1 195.6 1.73 6.71 3.03 14.10
37.2 39.3 76.2 1.83
30.0 30.2 29.9 63.4 61.7 61.6 1.75 2.14 0.933 1.476
12.1 12.0 24.6 1.71
35.6 8.74 35.5 9.44 71.1 18.2 1.86 0.602 0.213 0.112
3.48 3.72 7.19 1.97
40.6 2.84 40.6 2.86 81.2 5.65 2.10 0.163 0.0176 0.011
1.14 1.20 2.32 2.40
45.4 0.91 45.4 0.91 90.8 1.79 2.65 0.045 - 0.001
0.353 0.368 0.72 3.57
TABLE I. Numerical data for the main experiment with the TF-QKD protocols in refs. [21, 24]. The white (grey) rows in the
first, second and third column report the values for the signal gains Qua , Qub , Qu (decoy gains Qva , Qvb , Qv), respectively,
registered by detector D1 in Fig. 1a when only Alice, only Bob or both users send pulses to the intermediate node. When no
user sends out pulses, the measured gain is Q0 = 25.9× 10−9. The flux set by each user was ua = ub = 0.2 photons per pulse
for the signal states and va = vb = 0.08 photons per pulse for the decoy states. The total vacuum is set to w = 10
−5.
11
This article has been published in Nature Photonics 13, 334-338 (2019)
Phase randomised
Flux Gain (1 detector)
(×10−6)
uu 1.71
vv 18.2
ww 0.026
uv 8.77
uw 0.913
vw 8.74
Encoded
Flux Gain QBER
(×10−6) %
uu 1.79 2.65
TABLE II. Measured quantities for the protocol in ref. [26]. At 71.1 dB channel loss it provides a SKR of 270.7 bit/s, which is
2.42 times above the ideal SKC0 bound at the same attenuation (112.0 bit/s). The flux set by each user was ua = ub = 0.02
photons per pulse for the signal states and va = vb = 0.2 photons per pulse for the decoy states. The total vacuum was set to
w = 10−5.
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